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Abstract 
Based on data drawn from the Latin Library corpus, this paper discusses some previously under-
researched meanings of the secundum NP construction and traces their evolution across a period 
of over 800 years. The discussion focuses on the meanings of reportative evidentiality and a new 
conceptual category called “attribution”, whose function consists in ascribing a proposition to 
someone’s mental content (opinion, thought or belief). Two sub-categories of attribution are 
identified: other-attribution and self-attribution. Whereas the former is modal epistemic in 
nature, the latter is not. The data analysed in this paper suggest that the attribution and 
reportative meanings are distinct senses, as evidenced by their different semantic/pragmatic 
functions, development paths and preferences for different sets of arguments. Particular 
attention is paid to the spread of Christianity as a relevant socio-cultural context for the 
emergence of reportative constructions. From a pragmatic/interactional point of view, the notion 
of interpersonal evidentiality plays a central role in the emergence of the reportative evidential 
sense. Abstracting away from the case of the Latin secundum NP (‘according to’ NP) construction, 
this paper argues that both reportative evidentiality and attribution presuppose extended 
intersubjectivity and are deictic categories, even if they convey different meanings.  
Keywords  
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Abbreviations 
1P First person; 3P Third person; ABL Ablative; ACC Accusative; COMPTV Comparative; F Feminine; FUT 
Future; GEN Genitive; GER Gerund; INF Infinitive; IND Indicative; M Masculine; N Neuter; NOM Nominative; 
PL Plural; PASS Passive; PLUPERF Pluperfect; POSS Possessive; PRF Perfect; PRS Present; REL Relative 
pronoun; SBJV Subjunctive; SG Singular. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
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1.1 Background 
Using a narrow definition of evidentiality as a grammatical category (Jakobson 
[1957]1963/2002, Anderson 1986, Willett 1988, Guentchéva 1996, Aikhenvald 2003a, 
2003b, 2004, 2007, Guentchéva & Landaburu 2007), Latin can be considered a language 
without evidentiality. However, based on a notional understanding of this category, 
defined on semantic/pragmatic grounds (e.g. Givón 1982, Mithun 1986, Jacobsen 1986, 
Ramat 1996, Ramat & Ricca 1998, Wiemer 2005, 2006, Pietrandrea 2007, Squartini 2007, 
Pietrandrea & Stathi 2010, Disney 2012), I claim that Latin does express reportative 
evidentiality (see also Magni 2010 and Greco 2013). 
This article discusses the rise of the reportative evidential meaning of the secundum 
(‘according to’) NP construction, a PP which has been so far under-explored in Latin 
studies on prepositions (Pinkster 1972: 145 ff., 1990: 65-72, Baldi 1979, 1999: 358-360, 
Lehmann 1983, Luraghi 1989, Joseph 1991, Baños Baños 1994, Vincent 1999, Bubenìk 
2006, Martìn Puente & Conde Salazar 2006, 2012, 2014, 2015, Luraghi’s 2010, Brucale & 
Mocciaro 2011, Short 2013, Trabelsi 2014, 2015), the only exceptions being the rather 
sketchy observations in Matos Rocha (1998), Vieira Ferrari (1998) and Heine & Kuteva 
(2002: 139). 
In this paper, reportative constructions, expressing the source of information the speaker 
has for uttering a proposition, are contrasted with attribution expressions. Within the 
function of attribution, two sub-domains are identified: by using other-attribution 
constructions, the speaker assigns a proposition to someone other than him/herself, 
whereas by using self-attribution constructions, the speaker ascribes a proposition to 
him/herself. Under a definition of epistemic modality as a subjective performative 
category, self-attribution expressions are modal epistemic in nature, whereas other-
attribution ones are not. The functional similarities shared between self-attribution and 
other-attribution expressions allow us to account for the fact that in some languages one 
and the same construction can express both (e.g. Italian secondo ‘according to’ NP).  
1.2 Theoretical preliminaries: Evidentiality and attribution 
As mentioned in section 1.1 above, I share a view of evidentiality as a conceptual category 
instead of a grammatical one. The core function of evidentiality is to present a proposition 
to the addressee, signalling how the speaker has acquired it (see Tantucci 2013 for a 
similar view). Reportative evidentiality is a sub-category indicating that the source of 
information a speaker has for uttering a proposition is something communicated by 
someone else (in speech or writing). The English according to NP expressions in 
sentences (1) and (2) below qualify a statement made by the writer, who indicates 
his/her source of information. Therefore, according to [the] police in (1) and according to 
our correspondent in (2) are reportative evidential constructions.  
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(1)  Man arrested after he beheaded his 'nagging' mother, according to police. (Levi 
Winchester, Express, 2nd January 2015)1 
(2)  Security sources say the situation has never been so grim, said BBC home affairs 
correspondent Margaret Gilmore. […] Each cell has a leader, a quartermaster dealing with 
weapons, and volunteers. According to our correspondent, each cell works on separate, 
different plots, with masterminds controlling several different cells. (Author unknown, 
“UK 'number one al-Qaeda target'”, BBC News, 19th October 2006)2 
Attribution, on the other hand, is a semantic category expressing that the speaker 
explicitly assigns a certain proposition to a person who may or may not be directly 
involved in the speech situation (speaker, hearer, third party). Crucially, this ascribed 
proposition, understood as someone’s mental content (thought, opinion, belief etc.), need 
not be overtly communicated to the speaker, who may simply infer, guess or even invent 
it. In his eyes in (3) and for him/for her in (4) qualify the modified statements as the 
opinions held by someone other than the writer.  
(3)  Butler had shown a keen personal interest in the preparation of the White Paper which 
underwent at least four drafts before it reached the finished version. In his eyes it came 
to rank on a par with his Education White Paper of 1943. (BNC 44 EEC) 
(4) For him, Ireland was best served by deep cultural transformation; for her, the first 
requirement was for bombs and bullets. (BNC 9 AK4) 
The conceptual category of attribution can be split into two sub-domains: other-
attribution and self-attribution. In the case of other-attribution, a proposition is assigned 
by the speaker to someone else, be it a third party as in (1) and (2) above, or the hearer 
as in (5), below.  
(5) The language of desire is rich and complex. It excludes you. For you, desire is a mobile 
flung in all directions and getting nowhere. (BNC 36 C9S) 
Self-attribution can be seen as a particular case of other-attribution, when the speaker 
construes him/herself as “split” or “divided” in two (Lakoff 1996, Talmy 2000) and 
assigns a proposition to the rational part of him/herself (conceived of as a separate 
individual). 
(6) This comment was, in my opinion, justified. (BNC 97 FD2) 
(7) To my mind, age does not matter; love is what matters. (BNC 6G1A) 
(8) In my eyes it's the hardest hole on the course. (BNC ASA W_misc) 
(9) For me Ilona is one of the world's great artists. (BNC 14 AHA) 
                                                          
1 Available at http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/549820/Man-beheaded-nagging-mother. Accessed 
October 1st 2015. 
2 Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6065460.stm. Accessed October 1st 2015. 
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Evidential expressions can be paraphrased as I have come to know that p [based on 
<source of information>] whereas attribution expressions can be paraphrased someone 
thinks that p (other-attribution), I think that p (self-attribution).  
Self-attribution constructions express epistemic modality, understood as a performative 
category conveying the speaker’s subjective evaluation of a state of affairs (commitment 
or likelihood of occurrence). In contrast, other-attribution expressions, being descriptive 
and not performative (see Nuyts 2001a: 39 for a definition of these terms) are non-
epistemic in nature.  
Some constructions express both other-attribution and reportative evidentiality: a case 
in point is the Italian secondo ‘according to’ NP construction, with the NP indexing 
someone other than the speaker (second person, third person). The meaning relation 
between other-attribution and reportative evidentiality can be expressed as follows: if 
the speaker has obtained a piece of information from someone else, s/he may construct 
this knowledge as a thought entertained by the person who passed the information on. 
Crucially, the opposite does not hold: other-attribution does not entail reportative 
evidentiality. In the case of constructions expressing both meanings, it is crucial to 
examine the pragmatic intention of the speaker, which emerges in context. In order to 
achieve this, usage-based research, including corpus-based studies, is more suitable than 
introspection or the examination of occurrences in isolation. 
Self-attribution expresses the fact that a speaker ascribes a certain proposition to 
him/herself as mental content (thought, opinion, belief) instead of presenting it as a 
factual statement. Such expressions impart the speaker’s viewpoint on a proposition, 
which may be interpreted as expressing doubt or uncertainty on the factuality of a state 
of affairs, but really convey the speaker’s commitment to the modified proposition 
(whose factuality is not asserted). 
 Self-attribution expressions can also convey inferential evidentiality (e.g. Pietrandrea 
2007 on Italian secondo me ‘in my view’, lit. ‘according to me’), but since this is not the 
case in my data-set, I shall not concern myself with this meaning here.  
1.3 Previous scholarship and contribution to the theoretical debate 
Attribution is a semantic/pragmatic category which has not been previously identified in 
the literature. The notion of attribution as used in this paper bears some resemblance to 
the notions of “attribution” in Sinclair (1988), Hunston (2000), and Bednarek (2006), but 
it is intended as a conceptual category rather than a discursive strategy. The term 
“attribution” is also used by Sanders (2008: 58), who defines the concept of “perspective” 
as a function expressing the “attribution of the validity claim of some units of information 
to a particular person in the narrative” (i.e. a character) (see also Sanders & Redeker 1996 
and the related concept of “perspectivisation” in Sanders & Spooren 1997). Also, for 
Sanders, perspective is a discursive/narratological concept. Rosier (2008) uses the term 
“attribution” to refer to the function of reported speech, whereas my understanding here 
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is narrower and does not encompass constructions with a reporting verb (whether 
explicit or contextually/co-textually available). Attribution is also similar to the notion of 
“inferred thought” (Semino & Short 2004), falling under the category of reported thought. 
However, as the authors themselves admit, this notion involves no reporting. The concept 
of attribution employed here also bears similarities to White’s “endorsements” (2003: 
270), the main difference being that attribution does not necessarily signal the speaker’s 
commitment to the attributed proposition (see section 1.2, above). The concept of 
attribution is also similar to the function called “judicantis” (Dressler 1970, van Hoecke 
1996, Draye 1996, Haspelmath 2003). However, “judicantis” seems to indicate a close 
relationship with the experiencer and beneficiary roles, which may be language specific. 
Finally, attribution bears some similarities to the notion of “ascription” in Nuyts (2001a: 
131 and 114, fn.5) but not elsewhere (2001a: 25, 78, 212), where it indicates dynamic 
modality or cause. The concept of attribution as proposed in this paper is radically 
different from the meaning of the term in psychology, where it indicates the process 
through which a person identifies and refers to the causes of behaviours and events (see 
‘attribution theory’ in Heider 1958, Jones & Davis 1965, Kelley 1967, Weiner 1992; see 
Gordon & Graham 2006 for a review). The term “attribution” in my research is also used 
differently than in the Gricean analysis of comprehension as a mind-reading activity, 
within theory of mind (Wilson & Sperber 2005). 
The conceptual category of attribution is a novel category introduced in this article to 
account for some uses of ‘according to’ NP which would not be otherwise adequately 
captured by either reportative evidentiality or epistemic modality (see infra), as 
evidenced by the case study on secundum NP discussed here. Being a novel category, 
“attribution” has not been the topic of any dedicated studies to date. Similarly, I am not 
aware of any study focussing specifically on ‘according to’ constructions. 
My case study shows that attribution and evidentiality are separate categories appearing 
at different points in time and via different paths. These are analysed in turn in sections 
2 and 3 below. Investigating the diachronic development of the reportative meaning 
brings into focus the socio-historical dimension in which it emerged (sections 2.2 and 
2.3). The analysis of the cultural context of early Christianity lends support to the 
development of this meaning out of the meaning of conformity via extended 
intersubjectivity (interpersonal evidentiality) (section 2.2.4), a heretofore under-
researched path suggested in Tantucci (2013). My study elaborates on and refines the 
fleeting suggestion in Wiemer (2005: 115) that there may be a connection between 
conformity and reportative evidentiality (see section 2.2.4 below). 
Many studies based on a conceptual/functional definition of evidentiality show a 
lexicographic approach aiming at testing the semantics of lexical units for evidential 
meaning, with the intention of constructing an inventory of evidential expressions 
(Wiemer 2010: 66; see also Wiemer 2005, 2006; Giacalone Ramat & Topadze 2007; 
Pietrandrea 2007; Squartini 2008). Some studies rely on a dichotomy between lexicon 
and grammar (e.g. Dendale & Van Bogaert 2007, Squartini 2008), whereas others view 
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them on a cline (e.g. Wiemer 2010, Wiemer & Stathi 2010). Ultimately, inventories of 
(more or fewer) lexical units are compared with inventories of grammatical evidential 
markers in order to refine and achieve consensus on one or more evidentiality 
models/systems (Willett 1998, Frawley 1992, Plungian 2001, Aikhenvald 2004).  
After blossoming in the 2000s, the investigation of lexical evidentiality seems to have  lost 
considerable momentum. This paper suggests that there is still potential in this field, 
provided that the focus is shifted towards the socio-cultural context for the emergence of 
lexical evidentials, and that the pragmatic/interactional motivations for evidential usage 
are explored further. A crucial point in many studies on lexical evidentiality is the 
relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality (e.g. De Haan 1999, Squartini 
2004, Pietrandrea 2007, Cornillie 2009). My research suggests also that the relationship 
between evidentiality and attribution would be an interesting area to investigate in 
greater detail. In fact, the category of attribution was previously overlooked altogether 
or erroneously conflated with evidentiality (Pietrandrea 2007, Wiemer 2010).  
1.4 Data and method 
The analysis in this chapter is based on data drawn from the Latin Library corpus, a 12M-
word POS-tagged resource created by Andrew Hardie and me at Lancaster University 
with digital materials gathered by William L. Carey (George Mason University and the 
University of Maryland) and structured for analysis in the CQP workbench (Hardie 2012). 
The Latin Library corpus is freely available on the UCREL website 
(https://cqpweb.lancs.ac.uk/). 
This corpus includes literary production (and some documents) written over a 1,130-
year period, ranging from 285 BC to 845 AD, and encompasses both prose and poetry. My 
analysis focuses on prose only. 
The internal periodisation of the corpus comprises nine periods (285-149 BC; 106 BC -
17 AD; 4 BC - 140 AD; 100-258; 250-350; 330-469; 474-580; 530-704; 672-845), each 
lasting an average of 139 years. For reasons of feasibility, my study is based on four 
periods only:3 Classical Latin (106 BC - 17 AD), Silver Latin (100-258), Late Latin (330-
469) and Early Medieval Latin (530-704) (see table 1, below).  
                                                          
3 The name chosen for each period is just a label, which does not reflect the traditional periodisation used 
in Latin literature or the history of Latin, which are: (a) Early/Archaic/Old Latin (241-78 BC), (b) 
Golden/Classical Latin (78 BC-17 AD), (c) Silver Latin (14-117), and (d) Late/Christian/Vulgar/Brazen 
Latin (117-476 or 117-845). These traditional labels are based on the perceived quality (gold-silver-
bronze) or content (Pagan-Christian) of the works produced over time, whereas my labels are neutral in 
this respect. Furthermore, the traditional periodisations produce time spans of different lengths, which are 
difficult to compare. Instead, my periodisation results in periods of similar lengths, with a range (i.e. the 
difference between the longest and shortest period) of only 74 years in contrast to the periodisations by 
Conte (1994; range = 249 years), Mazzini (2007; range = 433 years) and Clackson (2011; range = 700 
years). In sum, the Latin Library corpus provides more uniformly spaced data points than the previous 
periodisations.  
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Within this sub-corpus (amounting to 6,138,896 words), a random sample of 250 
instances per period was analysed, with the exception of the Early Medieval period only 
featuring a population of 140 occurrences, thus yielding a total sample of 890. This is a 
representative sample of the expected occurrences of secundum NP, which is estimated 
to be between 2,263 and 2,356. 
Within this 890-word sample, I identified 100 instances of secundum NP with reportative 
or attribution meaning. Their distribution is shown in table 1 below. In the category of 
attribution, the sub-category of other-attribution is attested throughout, whereas self-
attribution is rare and attested only in Silver Latin (see table 2, below). The results 
presented in this chapter rely on a qualitative analysis only.  
 
 
 
Classical Latin 
106 BC-17 AD 
Silver Latin 
100-258 
Late Latin 
330-469 
Early Medieval Latin 
530-704 
 
Total 
out of 890 
 
#,% # % # % 
# out of 
140 
# normed 
to 250 
%  
Attribution 0 12 4.8 6 2 12 21.42 8.6 30 
Reportative 
Evidentiality 
0 42 16.8 10 4 18 32.14 12.9 70 
Total 0 54 21.6 16 6 30 53.56 21.5 100 
Table 1. Frequency of secundum NP with reportative and attribution meanings.  
 
 
Silver Latin 
100-258 
# % 
Self-Attribution 4 1.6 
Other-Attribution 8 3.2 
Reportative Evidentiality 42 16.8 
Table 2. Self-attribution and other-attribution in Silver Latin (Tertullian).  
This paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3 compare and contrast reportative and 
attribution expressions. Section 2.1 examines the arguments taken by the two 
constructions. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 discuss the emergence of the reportative meaning, and 
the micro-construction evangelium secundum Nevangelist ‘the Gospel according to’, 
respectively. Next, section 3 describes the emergence of attribution constructions, 
focussing on the distinction between other- and self-attribution. Section 4 examines 
attribution expressions in contexts of contrast. Section 5 goes beyond the specific facts of 
Latin to present a theoretical discussion of the categories of attribution and reportative 
evidentiality in relation to the concept of extended intersubjectivity. Finally, section 6 
concludes the paper. 
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2. Reportative evidentiality 
2.1 Arguments of reportative and attribution secundum NP 
The arguments of secundum NP with reportative meaning have ‘information’ as a salient 
meaning component. This is clear in the case of arguments meaning ‘spoken or written 
media’, such as praedicatio ‘prophecy’, prophetia ‘prophecy’,  psalmum ‘psalm’, Scripturae 
‘Scriptures’, and dictum ‘saying’. For instance:  
(10) Secundum      evangeli-um  
 According.to     Gospel-ACC.N.SG 
‘According to the Gospel’ = ‘according to the information in the Gospel’ (Tertullian, 
Adversus Marcionem 5, 6, 7) 
If an argument of secundum indicates a human participant, for instance propheta ‘the 
prophet’, Daniel ‘Daniel’, and quisdam ‘someone’, by metonymy this is to be understood 
here as ‘the information conveyed by a person’ (cfr. Wiemer 2007: 186 for a similar 
analysis regarding Lithuanian pagal ‘according to’).   
(11) Secundum      apostol-um  
 According.to     apostle-ACC.M.SG 
‘According to what the apostle said/wrote.’ (Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem 3, 24, 11)  
The central notion of attribution is that of ‘mental content’ (thought, belief, opinion), 
which is reflected in the set of arguments taken by secundum NP with attribution 
function: two examples are opinio ‘opinion’ and consilium ‘opinion’ (one occurrence of 
each word in the Silver Latin sample only). Also nouns indicating person or personified 
God appear as complements of secundum (e.g. homines ‘human beings’, Cicero ‘Cicero’, 
Deus ‘God’): for these human participants, a metonymy is active whereby a person stands 
in place of his/her thoughts, beliefs or opinions. This metonymy is different than the one 
active in contexts of reportative evidentiality, which suggests that different construal 
operations are in place for the two meanings.  
2.2 Emergence of the reportative meaning 
This section analyses various reportative constructions in order to offer a possible 
account of how this meaning emerged and evolved during the history of Latin. The 
reconstruction proposed here suggests that the reportative sense stemmed from the 
conformity meaning of secundum NP with VP scope. My analysis also argues for the 
importance of the socio-cultural context connected to the spread of Christianity as a key 
factor for the language change examined.  
Overall, my study argues for a gradual emergence of the reportative meaning via 
inference (a metonymical process, as suggested in Traugott & Dasher 2002: 78 ff.), 
instead of supporting the idea of the metaphorical leap THOUGHT IS TRAVEL, suggested 
in the literature (Vieira Ferrari 1998, Matos Rocha 1998).  
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In order to reconstruct a possible evolution of the reportative meaning of secundum NP, 
it is necessary to identify three sub-categories of reportative constructions, which 
contrast with one another on semantic and syntactic grounds. First, there are secundum 
NP expressions used in contexts of prophecy; second, such expressions appear in non-
prophecy contexts; and third, there is the partly filled construction evangelium secundum 
Nevangelist ‘the Gospel according to Nevangelist’(e.g. evangelium secundum Marcum ‘the Gospel 
according to Mark’). I argue that the first two constructions possibly arose out of the 
conformity meaning via extended intersubjective uses, whereas the expression 
evangelium secundum Nevangelist emerged through a different path, i.e. as a calque from 
Biblical Greek.  
2.2.1 Prophecy contexts 
In this section and 2.2.2 below, I claim that the reportative sense of secundum NP emerged 
in close connection to the meaning of conformity (exemplified in 12 and 13 below). The 
conformity meaning is the most frequent meaning of secundum NP throughout the history 
of Latin (91/250 occurrences in Classical Latin, 36.4%; 156/250 in Silver Latin, 62.4%; 
148/250 occurrences in Late Latin, 59.2%; and 82/250 occurrences, normalised data, in 
Early Medieval Latin, 32.8%). This meaning captures a ‘logical’ relation of compliance 
between two entities.  
(12) Ita fin-is                 bon-orum         exist-it,                        secundum                natur-am               
 So end-NOM.F.SG   good-GEN.N.PL exist-IND.PRS.3P.SG   in.accordance.with    nature-ACC.F.SG  
viv-ere.  
live-INF.PRS 
‘Thus arises “the end of goods”, namely to live in accordance with nature.’ (Cicero, De 
Finibus 5, 24) 
(13) Accep-erat                                     a       domin-o           su-o…                           disciplin-am  
Took(PRF)-IND.PLUPERF.3P.SG    from God-ABL.M.SG POSS.3P.SG-ABL.M.SG rule-ACC.F.SG  
secundum              leg-em           viv-endi.  
in.accordance.with law-ACC.F.SG   live-GEN.GER 
 ‘He had received from his Lord… the rule to live according to the law.’ (Tertullian, Liber 
Scorpiace 5, 11) 
The crucial context for the extension of secundum NP from conformity to reportative 
evidentiality appears in Christian Latin (i.e. from the second century AD onwards), 
specifically in theological treatises mentioning events fulfilling Biblical prophecies. The 
realisation of such prophecies is crucial for Christians (and Jews) as proof validating the 
divine inspiration of the Bible. Specifically, for Christians, many prophecies which find 
their accomplishment in the person and the life of Jesus are regarded as proof that he is 
indeed the Messiah. These prophecies link the Old to the New Testament by viewing the 
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latter as fulfilling the former. One clear example of this is found in the Niceno-
Constantinopolitan Creed4 (381 AD).  
 (14)  Cred-o…   in un-um   Domin-um  Ies-um     
 Believe-IND.PRS.1P.SG in one-ACC.M.SG. Lord-ACC.M.SG Jesus-ACC.M.SG   
Christ-um…         qu-i…               resurrex-it                  terti-a     
 Christ-ACC.M.SG REL-NOM.M.SG. resurrect(PRF)-IND.PRF.3P.SG  third- ABL.F.SG  
die,                       secundum  Scriptur-as.  
day(ABL.F.SG)     according.to  Scripture-ACC.F.PL 
‘I believe in Jesus Christ, our (lit. the only) Lord, who rose <from the dead> on the third 
day, according to the Scriptures.’ (Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, 381, Missale 
Romanum, editio typica tertia, 2002) 
 
Sentence (14) above affords three interpretations. According to the first, the writer wants 
to communicate that the event codified in the predicate took place as a fulfilment of what 
was foretold in a prophetic text (‘the Scriptures’). For convenience I refer to this sense as 
a ‘narrow’ conformity meaning, because of its narrow scope over constituents below the 
sentence, typically the VP. The secundum NP construction in (14) encodes a manner 
specification of the verb (answering the question In what way did Christ resurrect?). This 
reading can be rendered with the paraphrase in (15): 
(15) I believe in Jesus Christ, our Lord, who [[[rose] [from the dead] [on the third day]] 
[fulfilling/accomplishing the Scriptures]].  
The second possible interpretation for (14) is that the state of affairs encoded in the 
whole relative clause holds in conformity to what is written in the Bible. For convenience 
I refer to this sense as a ‘broad’ conformity reading, because of its broad scope over the 
whole sentence. This interpretation can be rendered as in (16): 
(16) I believe in Jesus Christ, our Lord, [[who rose from the dead on the third day], [as is 
written in the Scriptures]].  
The third interpretation of secundum NP in (14) is evidential-reportative. Under this 
reading, the speaker qualifies his/her source of information for the state of affairs coded 
in the whole sentence, which s/he clearly has not witnessed directly. The knowledge of 
this state of affairs is qualified as learnt from the Bible. Just like in the case of the broad 
conformity interpretation paraphrased in (16), the scope here is sentential. The 
reportative reading can be rendered as in (17): 
                                                          
4 The Creed was originally written in Greek, and then translated into Latin. However, as Criniti (2014) 
points out, there is a lack of contemporary written tradition of the Creed in Latin. Criniti (ibid.) observes 
that this lack of documentation was justified in late antiquity and Early Medieval works by the fact that the 
Creed was considered so sacred that it would be blasphemous to write it down; hence, oral transmission 
was preferred. Therefore, the first complete Latin transcription of the Creed is quite late (Cesarius, bishop 
of Arles, ante 542; see also Rufinus of Aquileia, Commentarium Symbolum Apostolorum, end of the fourth 
century). The Latin translation included here is from the Missale Romanum, editio typica tertia (2002). 
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(17) I believe in Jesus Christ, our Lord, [[who rose from the dead on the third day], [which I 
know/have learnt based on the Scriptures]].  
Examples of contexts in which all three interpretations are available can be found in 
Silver and Late Latin, but not in Classical Latin where the only possible interpretation is 
one of narrow conformity, i.e. a meaning pertaining to the logical domain and not to the 
interpersonal sphere.  
A similar example to (14) above, but showing ‘person’ as the NP argument of secundum, 
is (18) below, taken from the Silver Latin section of the Latin Library corpus (second-
third century AD): 
 (18) Denique ostend-amus                 et     ven-isse              iam         Christ-um  
 In.fact       show-SBJV.PRS.1P.PL   also  come-INF.PRF    already   Christ-ACC.M.SG 
secundum      prophet-as…  
according.to      prophet-ACC.PL 
(Tertullian, Adversus Iudaeos, 13, 8). 
(a) in fact let us show that Christ is already come as foretold through the 
prophets/accomplishing what the prophets wrote (narrow conformity). 
(b) in fact let us show that Christ is already come, as the prophets said/wrote (broad 
conformity). 
(c) in fact let us show that Christ is already come, which I know because of what the 
prophets wrote (reportative). 
The first interpretation available for secundum NP in example (18) is one of conformity 
with narrow scope on the verb (18a). Here secundum prophetas is a manner modifier of 
the verb, answering the question How did Christ come? The second interpretation is one 
of broad conformity with wide scope over the sentence (18b). The third is reportative, 
signalling the source of information available to the writer for his statement venisse iam 
Christum ‘Christ has already come’ (18c).  
A further example in which all three interpretations of secundum NP are available is (19) 
below, from Late Latin, for which both a narrow (19a) and a broad conformity meaning 
(19b) are available, as well as the reportative interpretation (19c). 
(19)  Ita enim ven-iat…                           secundum     auctoritat-em           qu-ae  
 So  truly  come-SBJV.PRS.3P.SG      according.to     authority-ACC.F.SG      REL-NOM.F.SG 
in Act-ibus            Apostol-orum         contin-etur.  
in act-ABL.M.SG    apostle-GEN.M.PL    contain-IND.PRS.3P.SG.PASS 
(Augustine, De fide et symbolo).  
(a) He [[will come back] fulfilling the authoritative testimony which is contained in the 
Acts] (narrow conformity). 
(b) [[He will come back] in accordance with what is said in the authoritative testimony 
which is contained in the Acts] (broad conformity). 
(c) [He will come back] – I know it because it is said in the authoritative testimony which 
is contained in the Acts (reportative). 
[Note: here ‘authority’ is understood as ‘authoritative testimony’.] 
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2.2.2 Non-prophecy contexts 
Alongside contexts of prophecy, from Silver Latin onwards there are also non-prophecy 
contexts in which the reportative meaning of secundum NP is nevertheless available, 
alongside the meaning of broad conformity. Unlike in prophecy-contexts, the meaning of 
narrow conformity is not available. A clear example of this is (20) from Late Latin: 
(20) Secundum      Luc-am…       non… hoc                    dic-it    
 According.to     Luke-ACC.SG     not      this.ACC.N.SG    say-IND.PRS.3P.SG -  
domin-us…  
God-NOM.M.SG 
‘According to Luke, the Lord did not say this.’ (Augustine, Sermones 71, 34) 
The meanings of broad conformity and reportative evidentiality can be contrasted 
effectively through the translations in (21) and (22): 
(21) In accordance with what Luke wrote, the Lord did not say this. 
(22) The Lord did not say this – I know it based on/because of what Luke wrote. 
 
The unacceptability of the translation in (23) shows that the meaning of narrow 
conformity is not available for (20): 
(23) *The Lord did not say this fulfilling/accomplishing what Luke wrote. 
 
Other examples of non-prophecy contexts are found in Silver Latin (24), Late Latin (25), 
and Early Medieval Latin (26).  
(24)  Jes-us…                   secundum  nostr-um                      evangeli-um 
 Jesus-NOM.M.SG    according.to  POSS.1P.PL-ACC.N.SG   Gospel-ACC.N.SG  
diabol-us                 quoque in  temptation-e                  cognov-it…  
devil-NOM.M.SG       even        in  temptation-ABL.F.SG      know(PRF)-IND.PRF.3P.SG 
(Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem 5, 6, 7) 
‘Even the Devil at the temptation knew who Jesus was – according to our Gospel.’ 
(a) [[Even the Devil at the temptation knew who Jesus was] in accordance with what is 
written in our Gospel] (broad conformity) 
(b) [[Even the Devil at the temptation knew who Jesus was,] a fact I know because it is 
written in our Gospel] (reportative evidentiality) 
 
(25)  “Primogenit-us”             utique “a       mortu-is”                   secundum 
 First.born-NOM.M.SG      surely    from dead-ABL.M.PL          according.to  
eundem                        apostol-um.  
the.same-ACC.M.SG     apostle-ACC.M.SG 
(Augustine, De Trinitate 14, 19, 24)  
 ‘<He was> “The first born” surely “among the dead” – according to the very Apostle’ 
(a) [[<He was> “The first born” surely “among the dead”] – in accordance with what the 
Apostle said/wrote] (broad conformity) 
(b) [<He was> “The first born” surely “among the dead”] – I know it because of what the 
Apostle said/wrote] (reportative evidentiality) 
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(26) Praeterea secundum    Victorin-um                 enthymemat-is  
 Moreover  according.to    Victorinus-ACC.M.SG     enthymeme-GEN.SG 
est alter-a                  definitio. 
 is   other-NOM.F.SG    definition(NOM.F.SG) 
(Isidore, Etymologiae 2, 9.14) 
 ‘Moreover, there is another definition of the enthymeme, according to Victorinus.’ 
(a) [[Moreover, there is another definition of the enthymeme,] in accordance with what 
Victorinus says] (broad conformity) 
(b) [[Moreover, there is another definition of the enthymeme,] which I know because of 
what Victorinus wrote] (reportative evidentiality) 
 
As examples (24)-(26) demonstrate, the narrow conformity meaning, providing a 
manner specification of the verb phrase, is unavailable in contexts not related to 
prophecy. For this reason, I argue that the secundum NP construction in these contexts is 
less tightly related to its logical meaning of conformity, which has scope over the VP.  
2.2.3 Chronology 
Table 3 below shows that the reportative meaning of secundum NP is absent in Classical 
Latin, and emerges in Silver Latin as an extension of the narrow conformity meaning. The 
table also shows that in Early Medieval Latin, there is a separation between the narrow 
conformity meaning on the one hand and the reportative meaning on the other, which is 
still compatible with the broad conformity meaning. This reflects the lack of prophecy 
contexts in my Early Medieval Latin corpus.5 Overall, the data suggest that the reportative 
meaning does not acquire full independence from the conformity meaning.  
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Conformity 
adjunct 
(a) narrow conformity meaning with scope on the VP x x x x 
Example: The judge punishes according to the law. 
Prophecy 
contexts 
(adjunct, 
disjunct) 
(a)  narrow conformity meaning with scope on the VP  x x  
(b)  broad conformity meaning with scope over S 
(c)  reportative meaning with scope over S  
Example: Christ arose on the third day according to the Scriptures. 
Non-
prophecy 
contexts 
(adjunct) 
(b)  broad conformity meaning with scope over S  x x x 
(c)  reportative meaning with scope over S  
Example: According to the Bible, the world was created in six days. 
Table 3. Multi-functionality patterns of secundum NP: conformity and reportative meanings.  
 
                                                          
5 Data from the Early Medieval period, however, needs to be interpreted with caution because the Early 
Medieval sub-corpus is smaller. If the prophecy meaning was available in Early Romance languages, this 
would suggest continuity through Late Latin. However, this investigation falls outside the scope of this 
article.   
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2.2.4 Extended intersubjectivity and interpersonal evidentiality 
In order to understand the semantic extension from conformity to reportative, the notion 
of ‘extended intersubjectivity’ introduced by Tantucci (2013: 217, elaborating further on 
Nuyts 2001b: 393) is particularly relevant. This notion captures the involvement of a 
third party, singular or plural, who is not participating directly in the speech event, but is 
construed as sharing the information conveyed by the speaker/writer to the 
listener/reader. According to Tantucci (2013: 219), an example of extended 
intersubjectivity can be found in (27): 
(27)  It has been argued that Abelard’s theory is too subjective. (BNC ABV 1365 from Tantucci 
ibid.)  
In (27), “the information communicated… pertains to a type of common knowledge 
shared by the SP[eaker]/W[riter] and an assumed 3rdP[arty] constituted by those people 
who actually argued on Abelard’s theory and those ones who – in one way or another – 
came to know about it” (ibid.). Importantly for the present discussion, expressions like it 
has been argued in (27) may acquire evidential meaning by virtue of their being 
extensively intersubjective. As Tantucci (2013: 219) says, “this sort of evidential 
substance is grounded in the assumed social agreement upon an assertion”; therefore, he 
calls this type of evidentiality “interpersonal evidentiality”.6  
Reportative expressions are found in Christian Latin and specifically in apologetic 
writings (e.g. Tertullian’s Adversus Marcionem, Augustine’s De Civitate Dei); dogmatic-
polemical-moral works (e.g. Tertullian’s De Anima, Augustine’s De Trinitate); practical-
ascetic treatises (Tertullian’s De Monogamia); sermons (Augustine’s Sermones); and 
encyclopaedias (Isidore’s Sententiae and Etymologiae). It is important to consider the 
intended audience of these texts in order to understand the shared knowledge between 
the writer, reader, and community at large.  
Some texts are explicitly directed to believers, and others to heretics (i.e. professed 
believers who maintain religious opinions contrary to those accepted by their church). 
An example of the former is Augustine’s Sermones and examples of the latter are 
Tertullian’s Adversus Marcionem, Adversus Valentinianos, Adversus Hermogenem and 
Adversus Praxean. Some texts are apparently directed against the pagans or members of 
other religions, such as the Jews (e.g. Tertullian’s Adversus Iudaeos, Augustine’s De 
Civitate Dei). However, as argued by Dunn (2008: 51-56) for Tertullian’s Adversus Iudaeos 
on the one hand, and by Edelheit (2008: 275) and van Nuffelen (2012: 16) for Augustine’s 
                                                          
6 An anonymous reviewer pointed out the fact that interpersonal expressions such as “it is argued that” 
suggest a shared view – i.e. a general consensus bearing some commitment on the proposition – in contrast 
to reportative expressions, which often bear low speaker commitment. It is possible that expressions of 
extended intersubjectivity convey only a feeble sense of group commitment – which may well exclude the 
speaker altogether. In fact, extended intersubjectivity suggests that information is shared and known 
within a community, without necessarily implying that the speaker vouches for it. 
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De Civitate Dei on the other, even if the explicit target of the work is the pagans, in actual 
fact the writers address the community of Christians, or those who may already be on the 
way to conversion.  
An important point made by Dunn (2008: 56) when discussing Adversus Iudaeos is that 
writing is seen as a means of creating a sense of identity within the Christian community 
by setting it apart from other groups (or groups of ‘others’), e.g. Jews, heretics or pagans. 
Turnau (2006: 113), quoted in van Nuffelen (2012: 16) refers to a “three way dialogue” 
when reflecting on the readership of Augustine’s De Civitate Dei, and points out that 
Augustine “argues against the pagans to convince his intended audience who, as it were, 
have to judge the rhetorical debate between him and the pagans” (ibid.). Augustine’s 
intended audience “is not necessarily pagan” (ibid.), but it is more likely made up of 
Christians. The observations made on the basis of Tertullian’s Adversus Iudaeos and 
Augustine’s De Civitate Dei can be generalised to the apologetic-polemical-dogmatic 
literature written by other authors, who address their message to people who are part of 
their own in-group. 
It is reasonable to assume that the writer shares with his intended Christian readers the 
common belief that all true knowledge derives from the Bible (“For the Lord gives 
wisdom, from his mouth come knowledge and understanding”, Proverbia 2:6; see also 
Proverbia 1:7, 9:10 and Job 28:28). The knowledge of the Bible and its relevance for 
understanding the world are key features setting the Christian community apart from the 
pagans and promoting its sense of identity (Dunn 2008: 56). Furthermore, Christians 
differ from Jews because of their belief in the so-called New Testament, a body of 
scriptures expressing faith in Jesus Christ by putting him in direct relationship to the Old 
Testament, which therefore receives a “Christological interpretation” (Ratzinger 2001).  
This sense of identification is particularly important at a time when Christians are 
persecuted. Persecutions in the Roman Empire started in the first century (see the 
martyrdom of Stephen and James in the Actus Apostolorum 6:8-7:60 and 12:1-2 
respectively) and continued until (at least) 313 when the Edict of Milan proclaimed 
freedom of religion within the Roman Empire. The period from the second to the fifth 
century is also one of intense theological and doctrinal elaboration on the key concepts 
of Christianity on behalf of the so-called Fathers of the Church. In this period, the need for 
creating a sense of identity and community was felt at various levels of society.  
Given this social and cultural background, it is reasonable to assume that both the writers 
and readers of the apologetic texts hosted in the Latin Library corpus knew the most 
relevant Biblical episodes. Therefore, it may seem surprising to find so many explicit 
references to Biblical sources.  
For instance, going back to the Creed (example 14 above, here reproduced as 28), it seems 
implausible that the addressee does not know that Christ was “resurrected on the third 
day as foretold by the Scriptures” and needs to be told the source of information by the 
writer: 
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(28)  Cred-o…   in un-um   Domin-um  Ies-um     
 Believe-IND.PRS.1P.SG in one-ACC.M.SG. Lord-ACC.M.SG Jesus-ACC.M.SG   
Christ-um…         qu-i…               resurrex-it                  terti-a     
 Christ-ACC.M.SG REL-NOM.M.SG. resurrect(PRF)-IND.PRF.3P.SG  third-ABL.F.SG  
die,                      secundum  Scriptur-as.  
day(ABL.F.SG)     according.to  Scripture-ACC.F.PL 
‘I believe in Jesus Christ, our (lit. the only) Lord, who rose <from the dead> on the third 
day, according to the Scriptures.’ (Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, 381, Missale 
Romanum, editio typica tertia, 2002) 
However, as Tantucci argues (2013: 219), sometimes the main pragmatic motivation that 
a speaker/writer has when providing source of information for his/her statement is not 
to communicate new information to the hearer, but simply to share the source of 
information with somebody else. Therefore, in contexts like (28), the reference to the 
Scriptures is instrumental for the speaker in explicitly constructing his/her identity as a 
Christian, i.e. as an individual whose spirituality and identity are defined by his/her belief 
in the fulfilment of the messianic prophecies contained in the Old Testament (e.g. Psalmi 
22:16-18, Psalmi 68:18, 21-21; Psalmi 16:10, Psalmi 24:7-10). In doing so, while 
addressing his reader, the speaker/writer also implicitly calls on the community of 
believers as a third party, who share the knowledge of the relevant source of information. 
Therefore, for the speaker/writer, the main pragmatic reason for explicitly mentioning 
his source of information is to construe himself as a reliable and credible member of the 
Christian community.  
Even if the writer’s primary pragmatic motivation is not to communicate his source, the 
secundum NP construction may actually end up providing extra information for the 
reader, especially when lesser-known episodes from the Bible are presented, for which 
the source may in actual fact turn out to be obscure to the (less educated) reader. This is 
to say that in these situations, even if the main pragmatic intention of the writer is not to 
communicate the source of information, the reader may actually reinterpret the 
secundum NP construction as supplying relevant information regarding a new source of 
knowledge. This outcome is nevertheless consistent with the educational goals of the 
Christians, interested in preaching the word of God and promoting an understanding of 
the world mediated by the Scriptures. 
This educational interpretation is more obvious in those occurrences in which there is a 
literal quotation of the source, for which secundum NP fulfils a function somewhat similar 
to referencing in academia today. This usage is typical of Isidore’s style, appearing in 13 
out of 18 occurrences from the Early Medieval period (Sententiae 1: 3.1b, 3.2b, 10.8, 
14.15, 14.17, 25.3; Sententiae 2: 24.1, 39.18; Sententiae 3: 1.13, 44.3; Etymologiae 7,2,46; 
9,2,4; 15,1,1). Interestingly, Isidore’s works are deliberately educational. An example of 
Isidore’s usage is (29) below, containing a direct quotation from Paul’s epistle Ad 
Philippenses (4:7-9). A further example is (30), in which Augustine literally quotes some 
words taken from Paul’s letter Ad Colossenses (1:18).  
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(29) Human-a…             natur-a…                vid-ere          tamen       eius  
 Human-NOM.F.SG    nature-NOM.F.SG  see-INF.PRS  yet                POSS.3P.SG.GEN 
essenti-am               plen-e            non        val-et,                             qu-am                nec  
 essence-ACC.F.SG     complete-ly    neither   succeed-IND.PRS.3P.SG REL-ACC.F.SG     nor 
ips-a                       perfectio                       angelic-a                 in  tot-um  
 herself-NOM.F.SG  perfection(NOM.F.SG)  angelic-NOM.F.SG   in  all-ACC.N.SG  
adting-it                      sc-ire,                 secundum apostol-um            qu-i                    
reach-IND.PRS.3P.SG   know-INF.PRS  according.to apostle-ACC.M.PL     REL-NOM.M.SG 
ait:                            “Pax                         De-i,                  qu-ae  
 say.IND.PRS.3P.SG    Peace(NOM.F.SG)  God-GEN.M.SG  REL-NOM.F.SG  
exsuper-et                          omn-em         sens-um...”  
exceed-SUBJV.PRS.3P.SG    all-ACC.M.SG  sense-ACC.M.SG 
‘Human nature is not able to completely see his essence, which not even this angelic 
perfection (= the angels) can fully appreciate, as the Apostle says/according to the Apostle 
(who says):  “God’s peace goes beyond every sense…”’ (Isidore, Sententiae 1, 3.1b) 
(30)  “Primogenit-us”             utique “a       mortu-is”                   secundum 
 First.born-NOM.M.SG      surely    from dead-ABL.M.PL           according.to  
eundem                        apostol-um.  
the.same-ACC.M.SG     apostle-ACC.M.SG 
‘<He was> “The first born” surely “among the dead” – according to the very Apostle’ 
(Augustine, De Trinitate 14, 19, 24)  
So far, I have discussed cases in which there is a Biblical source, whose knowledge is 
supposed to be shared between writer and reader, and whose validity and credibility are 
assumed by the broader Christian community to which both the writer and reader 
belong. The same assumptions are not shared in the case of non-Biblical sources, for 
which the reportative interpretation is the only possible (or at least plausible) one. No 
extended intersubjectivity is pre-supposed in these cases.  
(31) Arbor-es          viv-ere          nec tamen      sap-ere            secundum    Aristotel-en 
 Tree-ACC.F.PL live-INF.PRS nor however   know-INF.PRS according.to   Aristotle-ACC.M.SG 
‘Trees have life, but have no knowledge, according to Aristotle.’ (Tertullian, De Anima 19, 
2) 
(32) Secundum    Livi-um              legat-i                                   pac-is  
 According.to   Livy-ACC.M.SG     ambassador-NOM.M.PL        peace-GEN.F.SG  
“caduceator-es”           dic-untur. 
caduceator-NOM.M.PL  say-IND.PRS.3P.SG.PASS 
‘Based on Livy, the ambassadors of peace are called “caduceatores”.’ (Isidore, Etymologiae 
8, 45, 48)  
In sum, my analysis suggests that the reportative meaning of secundum NP arises out of 
the extended intersubjective function of the construction as a case of interpersonal 
evidentiality. Contexts of prophecy represent the bridging context for this semantic 
development, which is then extended to non-prophecy contexts and finally to non-biblical 
contexts. I argue that the meaning change happens because of the reader’s pragmatic 
reinterpretation of the writer’s intentions. 
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In the scant literature on the secundum NP construction (Vieira Ferrari 1998: 112, Matos 
Rocha 1998: 177), it has been suggested that the reportative meaning of secundum has 
emerged directly out of a meaning of sequence conveyed by the verb sequor ‘follow’, via 
the metaphor THOUGHT IS TRAVEL. Specifically, Vieira Ferrari argues that “just like in 
the space domain one traveller follows another, in the epistemic domain it is possible to 
‘follow’ a person’s ideas” (1998: 112, translation mine)7 and Matos Rocha (1998: 177) 
points out that “if ‘thought is travel’, it is possible to follow, to accompany this travel” 
(translation mine).8  
Instead of arising from a metaphorical mapping, my analysis suggests that the reportative 
meaning has gradually emerged out of the conformity meaning via contextual inferences, 
which are metonymic in nature (Traugott & Dasher 2002: 78 ff.). My explanation, 
therefore, supports the rather fleeting observation by Matos Rocha (1998: 177) that there 
is a link between the conformity and reportative meaning, and brings it to the centre of 
my discussion on the emergence of the latter. My analysis is also compatible with 
Wiemer’s observation that the reportative meaning of ‘according to’ NP constructions in 
Polish “has probably to be regarded as a direct offspring of their basic [sense: CG] of 
conformity” (2005: 115). 
2.3 The construction evangelium secundum Nevangelist and the word of the Lord 
In my sample there are no occurrences of secundum NP which could be interpreted as 
expressing pure reportative evidentiality, i.e. without accessing the meaning of broad 
conformity. There is, however, a construction in which the reportative meaning is clearly 
foregrounded, and that is the evangelium secundum Nevangelist construction (‘the Gospel 
according to Nevangelist’). Here are two examples from Late Latin: 
(33) Nam in evangeli-o            secundum Iohann-em       ita          leg-itur 
 So      in Gospel-ABL.N.SG   according.to  John-ACC.M.SG  like.this  read-IND.PRS.3P.SG.PASS 
 ‘So it reads like this in the Gospel according to John.’ (Augustine, De Trinitate 15, 19) 
(34) In evangeli-o              secundum    Ioann-em          vald-e         grav-e 
 In Gospel-ABL.N.SG     according.to     John-ACC.M.SG   serious-ly    grave-NOM.N.SG 
ostend-it                     esse              peccat-um.  
show-IND.PRS.3P.SG  be.INF.PRS   sin-NOM.N.SG 
 ‘(He) demonstrates that it is a serious sin in the Gospel according to John.’ (Augustine, 
Sermones 71) 
This usage of secundum translates Ancient Greek katà (taking a noun in the accusative 
case), which spread in Christian Greek.9 As Mazzeo (2001: 48, fn.30) points out, the usage 
of the construction euaggélion katà N.ACCevangelist is attested only from the second century, 
as documented by the papyrus 66 Bodmer II, the Muratori Fragment, and the works from 
                                                          
7 (Portuguese) “assim como no domìnio espacial um viajante segue o outro, no domìnio epistêmico, pode-
se ‘seguir’ as idéias de alguém.” 
8 (Portuguese) “Se “pensamento é viagem,” é possível seguir, acompanhar essa ‘viagem’.” 
9 Based on the data in Luraghi (2003), it looks like this new function was not attested in Classical Greek. 
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authors such as Ireneus (130-202 AD, Adversus Haereses 3,11,7) or Clemens of 
Alessandria (150-215 AD, Stromata 1,21, 14-15). Mazzeo (2001: 48) points out that in 
the title of the Gospels the construction with katà is used “to indicate the author of each 
book and not the origin or the belonging of the message”. This is in contrast to the use of 
the genitive of belonging (e.g. euaggélion toû Matthaíou ‘the Gospel of Matthew’), which 
is dispreferred10 because the Gospel always belongs only to God as his own word, even if 
it is communicated to the people through the evangelists, that is, in accordance to their 
words.11 The evangelist is therefore portrayed as a mouthpiece, instead of the author of 
the message. The evangelist’s role can be seen as Goffman’s (1981) “animator”, i.e. a 
speaker producing speech which is not his/her own (i.e. as a “a sound-box”) or Ducrot’s 
(1984) “speaking subject”. The role of “author”, in Goffman’s (1981) terms, or 
“enunciator” in Ducrot’s (1984), is therefore God’s.  
The need to express this theological distinction (ownership of the sacred word and means 
of dissemination) may have been the reason why a new construction was created in 
Greek. This construction was obtained by extending the conformity sense of katà (with 
the accusative) to express reportative meaning. Since the Gospels were translated from 
Greek, this distinction might be a calque, facilitated by the fact that Latin secundum 
already corresponded to katà in its conformity sense at the time of the translation. The 
partly-filled construction ‘the Gospel according to Nevangelist’ may have strengthened the 
reportative meaning of secundum NP.  
(Inter)subjective secundum NP constructions, however, do not only convey reportative 
evidentiality, but also attribution, a meaning to which now I turn.  
3. Attribution meaning 
3.1 Other-attribution 
The conformity meaning of secundum NP is prominent in those instances where the 
argument is ‘opinion’, as in (35) below, where secundum nostrorum praeceptorum 
opinionem is rendered as ‘in line with the opinion of our authorities’. This is a case of 
broad conformity, having scope over the whole direct-object clause nihil aliud per 
praeceptionem legari posse ‘nothing can be left to perception’.  
(35) Unde               intellig-imus                           nihil                            aliud                    secundum  
 From.where    understand-IN.PRES.1P.PL    nothing.NOM.N.SG     else.NOM.N.SG    according.to 
nostr-orum                   praecept-orum          opinion-em           per   praeception-em 
POSS.1P.PL-GEN.M.PL   authority-GEN.M.PL  opinion-ACC.F.SG     by     perception-ACC.F.SG 
leg-ari                          posse…  
leave-INF.PRS.PASS    can.INF.PRS 
                                                          
10 The genitive nevertheless appears, as is shown in the Muratori fragment par.10: quarti evangeliorum 
Iohannis  ‘the fourth Gospel [is that] of John’. 
11 In today’s Roman Catholic Mass, the lector still concludes the readings from the Gospel with the 
clausola: “The Word of the Lord” (http://catholic-resources.org/ChurchDocs/Mass.htm). 
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 ‘We perceive from this that in accordance with the opinion of our authorities nothing 
can be left to perception…’ (Gaius, Institutiones, 2, 220) 
In (35), a limitative interpretation is also available, possibly arising via inference, 
suggesting that the validity of the qualified clause is restricted to the opinion of the 
authorities invoked by the author. Under this limitation reading, (35) can be paraphrased 
as (36): 
(36) We perceive from this that as far as the opinion of our authorities is concerned, nothing 
can be left by perception 
The attribution meaning can be paraphrased as (37): 
(37) We perceive from this that for our authorities nothing can be left by perception/We 
perceive from this that our authorities think that nothing can be left by perception 
The semantic extension from conformity to limitation is attested in the domain of logical 
relationships between entities, even if it is not very frequent (there are no instances in 
Classical Latin, one instance only in Silver Latin, four instances in Late Latin and eleven 
(normalised) instances in Early Medieval Latin). An example of secundum NP expressing 
conformity and limitation is (38): 
(38)  Antea enim   dict-um            est ex voc-e                  passion-is              eius,                     quia  
 Before in.fact  said-ACC.N.SG is    by voice-ABL.F.SG  passion-GEN.F.SG POSS.3P.SG.GEN because 
secundum carn-em          cum  demonstr-aret                            humilitat-is  
 as.far.as         flesh-ACC.F.SG when demonstrate-SUBJ.IMPF.3P.SG humility-GEN.F.SG  
exempl-um  
example-ACC.N.SG 
‘Previously in fact (it) was said from the voice of his passion, because in accordance with 
his flesh/as far as his flesh is concerned when he demonstrated the example of humility’ 
(Augustine, Sermones 75) 
I argue that in examples like (35), above, the meaning of attribution arises from the 
conformity and limitation senses via invited inference.12 In fact, if a certain state of affairs 
holds in conformity with somebody’s opinion – or as far as someone’s opinion is 
concerned – then, by inference, it can be said that it actually is someone’s opinion. This 
type of reasoning correlates with inferential steps à la Grice (1975) and especially 
Levinson (2000). Specifically, the interpretation of conformity can be seen as responding 
to Grice’s maxim of Relation (‘Be relevant’), and that of limitation to his maxim of Quantity 
(‘Make your contribution as informative as it is required’). In those instances where 
secundum co-occurs with a person or (personified) God, the attribution meaning is more 
                                                          
12 I use the terms inference and implicature as umbrella terms, just as they are used in the literature on 
grammaticalisation (e.g. Hopper & Traugott 2003) in which (cancellation of implicature) tests are not 
regularly used in an attempt to distinguish them from entailments. In fact, allowing implicature and 
entailment to overlap is not entirely unproblematic. However, drawing a line between them does not 
detract from the fact that both involve a particular meaning/interpretation derived from the text as a result 
of some reasoning process (logical or pragmatic). The difference between implicature and entailment and 
how it might impact processes of language change could benefit from future research.  
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prominent than the conformity/limitation meanings, which are nevertheless still 
accessible.  
Example (39) below, from Silver Latin, is taken from a chapter in which Aulus Gellius 
discusses the meaning of various legal terms (such as lex ‘law’, privilegium ‘legal 
privilege’, rogatio ‘public consultation about a proposed law’, and plebisscitum ‘decree 
binding on the plebs’) by listing different definitions given by various authorities in the 
field. The glosses capture the broad conformity, limitation and attribution interpretations 
for (39).  
The reportative meaning in (39d), although plausible in isolation, does not capture the 
author’s intention in the text, which is to list a series of possible definitions of the terms 
considered and assign each one to their author. In other words, the author’s intention is 
not to qualify the information he conveys as acquired knowledge.  
 (39) Plebisscit-um                   igitur        est  secundum  eum                  Capiton-em  
 Plebisscitum-ACC.N.SG    therefore    is   according.to  he-ACC.3P.SG Capito-ACC.M.SG  
lex,                         qu-am                  pleb-es,                 non popul-us,                  
law(NOM.F.SG)    REL-ACC.F.SG       plebs-NOM.F.PL    not  people-NOM.F.SG   
accip-it.  
adopt-IND.PRS.3P.SG 
‘Therefore, according to (this person) Capito, a plebisscitum (a decree binding on the 
plebs) is a law which the commons adopt, and not the people.’ (Aulus Gellius, Noctes 
Atticae 10, 20, 6)  
(a) Therefore, in accordance with what Capito writes/thinks, a plebisscitum is a law which the 
commons adopt – and not the people. (broad conformity) 
(b) Therefore, as far as Capito is concerned (= as far as Capito’s thoughts are concerned), a 
plebisscitum is a law which the commons adopt – and not the people. (limitation) 
(c) Therefore, Capito believes that a plebisscitum is a law which the commons adopt – and not the 
people. (attribution) 
(d)*Therefore a plebisscitum is a law which the commons adopt – and not the people; a fact I 
know based on Capito’s writings. (reportative evidentiality) 
Example (39) above shows that the meanings of conformity and limitation on the one 
hand and attribution on the other are connected by inference. Specifically, if a definition 
holds true in accordance with an author’s thoughts or words (conformity), then it may be 
valid just for the author who formulated it (while other definitions may also be possible) 
(limitation). The text type and immediate context foreground the limitative 
interpretation, since the text’s main feature is to list (and compare) definitions in 
association with their authors. Next, the inferential connection between limitation and 
attribution is the following: if a definition is valid for one author, then it can be said that 
that author holds the contents of that definition as an opinion or a belief.  
The following two examples from Early Medieval Latin are even clearer than (39) in 
allowing the broad conformity, limitation and attribution meanings, while ruling out the 
reportative interpretation altogether. Example (40) is taken from Isidore’s Etymologiae, 
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an encyclopaedia listing various traditions belonging to different peoples regarding the 
time conventionally agreed upon to mark the beginning of the day.   
(40) Di-es                    secundum     Aegypti-os                incho-at                       ab  
 Day-NOM.M.SG    according.to   Egyptian-ACC.M.SG    begin-IND.PRS.3P.SG   from 
occas-u                    sol-is;                secundum    Pers-as                ab      ort-u 
setting-ABL.M.SG    sun-GEN.M.SG  according.to    Persian-ACC.PL   from   rising-ABL.M.SG  
sol-is;                 secundum    Atheniens-es          a        sext-a                hor-a                  
sun-GEN.M.SG   according.to   Athenian-ACC.M.PL  from  sixth-ABL.F.SG  hour-ABL.F.SG  
die-i;                 secundum     Roman-os              a         medi-a             noct-e.  
day-GEN.M.SG  according.to  Roman-ACC.M.PL  from   mid-ABL.F.SG  night-ABL.F.SG 
‘The day according to the Egyptians begins at sunset; according to the Persians at dawn; 
according to the Athenians at the sixth hour of the day; according to the Romans at 
midnight.’ (Isidore, Etymologiae 5, 4) 
In (40) it is clear that the author intends to compare a set of contrasting beliefs, and not 
to communicate his knowledge about a series of states of affairs while pointing out how 
(i.e. from whom) he acquired his knowledge. Therefore, the reportative meaning is ruled 
out as a possible interpretation (41d), whereas the broad conformity (41a), limitation 
(41b), and attribution (41c) meanings are all available.  
 (41) Di-es                   secundum    Aegypti-os                  incho-at                         ab  
 Day-NOM.M.SG  according.to   Egyptian-ACC.M.SG       begin-IND.PRS.3P.SG    from 
occas-u                    sol-is. 
setting-ABL.M.SG    sun-GEN.M.SG 
‘The day according to the Egyptians begins at sunset.’ (Isidore, Etymologiae 5, 4) 
(a) The day in accordance with what the Egyptians say/write/believe begins at sunset. (broad 
conformity) 
(b) As far as the Egyptians are concerned,/Regarding the Egyptians, the day begins at sunset. 
(limitation) 
(c) The Egyptians believe/think that/hold the opinion that the day begins at sunset. (attribution) 
(d) *The day begins at sunset, which I know based on what the Egyptians say/wrote. 
The reportative meaning is also incompatible in (42) below. In this example, in which the 
broad conformity and limitation meanings are still accessible (42a and 42b), the writer 
intends to communicate (and contrast) the opinions held by God and the people (the 
other-attribution meaning in 42c), not to state two contrasting states of affairs qualifying 
the source of information he has for each of them (the reportative meaning in 42d). 
 (42) Qu-i                       secundum      saecul-um            sapiens                     est,  
REL-NOM.M.SG    according.to     world-ACC.N.SG      wise(NOM.M.SG)     is 
secundum     De-um            stult-us                     est.  
according.to    God-ACC.M.SG stupid-NOM.M.SG    is 
‘The person who is wise according to the [people of this] world is foolish according to 
God.’ (Isidore, Sententiae 2, 1.2) 
(a) The person who is wise in line with the (judgment of the people of this) world is foolish in 
accordance with the judgment of God. (broad conformity) 
(b) The person who is wise as far as the people of the world are concerned is foolish as far as (the 
judgment of) God is concerned. (limitation) 
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(c) The person who is wise in the eyes of the people of this world is foolish in the eyes of God. 
(attribution) 
(d)*The person who is wise (which I know it based on what the people of this world say) is 
foolish (which I know based on what God says). (reportative evidentiality) 
The examples described in this section show that the reportative and other-attribution 
meanings may be incompatible since they reflect fundamentally different communicative 
intentions on the part of the speaker. This counts as evidence that the two categories of 
reportative evidentiality and other-attribution are distinct. In all the examples examined 
in this section, both the broad conformity and limitation meanings are still accessible. It 
appears therefore quite clear that the attribution meaning is an extension of the 
conformity and limitation meanings, which has not completely separated from its source. 
In other words, there is no evidence that this inference ever fully semanticised in Latin.  
3.2 Self-attribution 
In the Latin Library corpus, there are only four instances of self-attribution, all from 
Tertullian.13 On the basis of this, one may argue that this construction belongs to 
Tertullian’s idiolect (or dialect).  
The construction secundum meum consilium ‘in my view’ involves an interpretation of the 
speaker/cogniser as a “split” or “divided” self (Lakoff 1996, Talmy 2000: 430 ff.), 
inasmuch as the rational component of the individual is singled out and a belief is 
attributed to it (see section 1.2 above). The interpretations of broad conformity and 
limitation are prominent in this construction, but an interpretation of self-attribution is 
also possible, as shown in (43). 
(43) At   enim    felic-ior                                   er-it,                       inqu-it,  
 But in-fact  happy-COMPTV.NOM.M.SG  be-IND.FUT.3P.SG say-IND.FUT.3P.SG 
si sic            permans-erit,                         secundum     me-um 
if like.this    remain-IND.FUT.PRF.3P.SG   according.to     POSS.1P.SG-ACC.N.SG 
consili-um.  
opinion-ACC.N.SG 
‘“But happier will she be”, he says, “if she shall remain permanently as she is, in accordance 
with my opinion/as far as my opinion is concerned/in my view”.’ (Tertullian, De 
Exhortatione Castitatis 4, 4) 
The metonymy by which an argument codifying a human participant stands in place of a 
person’s thoughts, opinions or beliefs, is active also in the case of secundum nos ‘in our 
view’ (lit. ‘according to us’), in examples (44) and (45) below, and secundum me ‘in my 
view’ (lit. ‘according to me’) in (46). In (44) and (45) the first person plural is a form of 
pluralis modestiae ‘plural of modesty’ (Head 1978: 164-165 and fn. 10), and it has a 
singular referent, i.e. the author. For all these examples, readings of both broad 
conformity and limitation are accessible, but the attribution meaning is foregrounded, 
                                                          
13 Three occurrences were captured by querying the Latin Library’s Silver Latin sample for the preposition 
secundum, whereas the fourth was obtained by interrogating the whole corpus for the construction 
secundum me ‘in my opinion’. 
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reflecting the pragmatic intention of the author to explicitly ascribe a certain proposition 
to himself as his own opinion. 
(44) Sive      enim    Christ-us                 iam         tunc  in semetips-um  
 Either   in.fact    Christ-NOM.M.SG   already    then    in himself-ACC.M.SG  
[pronunti-abat]                    secundum     nos,           sive prophet-es 
pronounce-IND.PRS.3P.SG    according.to     we.ACC      or     prophet-ACC.M.SG  
de         semetips-o              secundum    Iudae-os            pronunti-abat… 
about    himself-ACC.M.SG   according.to  Jew-ACC.M.PL    pronounce- IND.PRS.3P.SG 
‘For whether, as we interpret it (in line with what we think/as far as opinion is 
concerned/in our mind), it was Christ so early as that making a pronouncement regarding 
himself, or whether, as the Jews would have it, the prophet was speaking of himself.’ 
(Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem 3, 5, 3)  
(45) At    quanto       credibil-ius                               secundum     nos           eius  
 But   how.much  credible-COMPTV.NOM.N.SG   according.to      we.ACC      POSS.3P.SG-GEN.F.SG 
r-ei                        disposition-em          scriptur-a                 subiunx-it!14  
thing-GEN.F.SG    disposition-ACC.F.SG scripture-NOM.SG     subjoin(PRF)-IND.PRF.3P.SG 
‘But how much more credible that, in line with what we think/as far as our opinion is 
concerned/in our eyes, the Scripture has only subjoined the arrangement of the subject!’ 
(Tertullian, Adversus Hermogenem 26, 2). 
(46) Superest                          ut     secundum me     quidem credibil-e                 sit… 
 Remain.IND.PRS.3P.SG  that   according.to I.ACC indeed   credible-NOM.N.SG be.SUBJ.PRS.3P.SG 
virtut-es             et    potestat-es         creator-is               de-um…  
Virtue-ACC.F.SG and power-ACC.F.SG  creator-GEN.M.SG  God-ACC.M.SG  
crucifix-isse  
crucify-INF.PRF  
‘Indeed it remains [the fact] that in accordance with my thoughts/as far as my thoughts 
are concerned/in my opinion it is credible that the virtues and the powers of the Creator 
crucified God.’ (Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem 5, 6) 
The function which I call “self-attribution” is subjective, and modal epistemic in nature.  
A word of warning is in order here. Because of my very small data-set (consisting of four 
instances only), one needs to be very cautious in making generalisations about self-
                                                          
14 ‘But how much more credible is our opinion, which holds that Scripture has only subjoined the 
arrangement of the subject!’ is the translation provided by Holmes (1885[1870]). Example (45) is 
controversial because the matrix At quanto credibilius [est] is followed by a subject complement clause 
which in classical Latin would be expected to display the accusativus cum infinito (ACI) construction, that 
is, a complement clause with the subject in the accusative case and the verb in the infinitive. Instead, here 
the complement clause displays an ‘anomaly’, namely the subject in the nominative (scriptura) and the verb 
in the indicative (subiunxit). However, this may just be a sign of the language evolving towards the Romance 
nominativus cum indicativo pattern for complement clauses. Finally, it could also be a ‘symptom’ of the fact 
that the final –m was feebly pronounced, as already pointed out by the grammarian Quintilian in the first 
century AD, well before Tertullian’s time (155-240 AD). 
Different interpretations about this syntactic structure, however, do not impact on the meaning of 
secundum nos, which can be interpreted as an instance of either conformity (‘in line with what I think’), 
limitation (‘as far as I am concerned’), or self-attribution (‘in my opinion, for me, in my eyes, from my point 
of view’). 
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attribution based on these examples. One may in fact either assume that secundum 
me/nos attribution constructions were more frequent than has been recorded for Latin 
or, alternatively, one may speculate that the Romance self-attribution expressions 
derived from Latin secundum (Italian secondo me ‘for me’ and French selon moi, lit. 
‘according to me’) are subsequent, independent innovations. Finally, it is also possible 
that the very few instances attested in Latin are just the beginning of a typical S-curve 
development (Croft 2000: 184), which gathers pace later on in Romance. 
4. Contrast in opinion is not contrast in evidence 
Because of their limitation reading, secundum NP constructions are ideal for contrasts of 
opinion. In some cases this contrast is explicit (examples 40, 42, and 44 above), whereas 
in others it is implicit (but may be inferred). This is the case for (47) below, in which there 
is an implicit contrast between people who think like Varro and people who do not.  
(47)  De-os                enim  ver-os                anim-am       mund-i                 ac   part-em  
 God-ACC.M.SG in.fact true-ACC.M.SG soul-ACC.F.SG world-GEN.M.SG and part-ACC.M.SG 
eius                  ist-e                    [Varr-o: CG]         definiv-it:                                ac  
he.GEN.M.SG   that-NOM.M.SG Varro-NOM.M.SG  define(PRF)-IND.PRS.3P.SG  and 
per hoc,                     quidquid                      hoc                      non     est,  
 for  this.ACC.N.SG     anything.NOM.N.SG     this.NOM.N.SG    non      is 
non est utique           secundum     ist-os               ver-us                 de-us.  
not  is    undoubtedly according.to    that-ACC.M.SG true-NOM.M.SG  God-NOM.M.SG 
‘Varro defined the Gods to be the soul of the world, and the parts of it. And therefore 
whatever falls not within this definition (lit. whatever this is not) is certainly not a true 
God, according to them.’ (Augustine, De Civitate Dei 7, 9) 
The association of the attribution and limitation meanings also makes attribution 
expressions ideal for contrasts of opinion when self-attribution is involved (examples 43-
46 above). Furthermore, in the case of self-attribution, possible opinions contrasting with 
the ones expressed by the speaker may be simply inferred (examples 45 and 46).  
It is possible to see alternative opinions (explicitly mentioned or inferred) as “Q contrast-
sets”, i.e. non-entailment sets correlating with Grice’s (1975) maxim of Quantity and 
Levinson’s first heuristic (2000: 35). Example (50) gives a non-entailing contrast-set 
consisting of colour terms (in curly brackets) (a speaker saying yellow implicates not red, 
not blue and so on). 
(48) {yellow, red, blue, …} > “yellow” +> “not red, not blue etc.” (Levinson 2000: 36).  
Importantly, attribution expressions signal a contrast in attribution, and not a contrast in 
evidence, and the two notions should not be conflated. In this, my analysis differs 
substantially from the one offered by Pietrandrea (2007: 54) in her study of Italian 
secondo me ‘in my view’ (lit. ‘according to me’). In contrast to Pietrandrea (ibid.), I 
maintain that if an ‘according to’ NP expression has evidential but also attribution 
meaning, it may express a contrast in opinion, as well as a contrast in evidence, depending 
on the context.  
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5. Discussion 
Despite being two different concepts, reportative evidentiality and attribution share 
some similarities because they both presuppose extended intersubjectivity (Tantucci 
2013: 217; see section 2.2.4 above). That is, both of them relate the speaker and the 
addressee to a “third party”, thus showing that the “awareness of the other persona(s) is 
not limited to the here-and-now of the discourse” (ibid.). Figure 1 below (taken from 
Tantucci 2013: 218) outlines the basic structure of extended intersubjectivity, displaying 
the connection between the speaker/writer (SP/W), the addressee/reader (AD/R) and a 
third party (3rdP), which can be singular or plural, identified or generic.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. The basic structure of extended intersubjectivity.  
Considering this basic structure, expressions of reportative evidentiality (49), 
interpersonal evidentiality (50) (Tantucci 2013: 219-220), and attribution (51) can be 
visually captured and compared clearly.  
(49)  Tiago  di-ñami-pida 
Tiago  3sgnf-die-PRES.REP 
‘Tiago has died.’ (the speaker has just learnt it [from someone: CG])  
(Tariana, Aikhenvald 2003: 101, sg=singular, nf=non feminine) 
(50)  Allegedly Abelard’s theory is too subjective. 
(51)  In Paul’s eyes, John is an idiot. 
The thick lines in figures (2) and (4), below, indicate that the third party is profiled 
(Langacker 1987: 288). The direction of the arrows may symbolise (a) that the SP/W is 
the recipient of information on the basis of something said by a third party (figure 2); (b) 
that information is shared between the speaker and third party (figure 3); or (c) that the 
SP/W actively attributes information to a third party (figure 4). The dashed arrows in 
figure (3) indicate that interpersonal evidentiality is compatible with reportative 
evidentiality and attribution but does not necessarily involve both.   
 
 
 
 
 
3rdP 
AD/R SP/W 
3rdP 
AD/R SP/W 
3rdP 
AD/R SP/W AD/R SP/W 
3rdP 
Figure 2. Reportative 
evidentiality and extended 
intersubjectivity.  
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Attribution and reportative evidentiality may overlap, and the conceptual connection 
between the two categories can be explained as follows: 
(52)  Phase 1. Attribution: I, the speaker, assign a proposition p to a person P.  
Phase 2. Ambiguous context: I, the speaker, assign a proposition p to a person P, and I may 
know p because it has been communicated to me via P’s speech (or writing). 
Phase 3. Reportative evidentiality: I, the speaker, say p specifying that I know/learnt it 
based on something that P has said (or written).  
As discussed in sections 1.2 and 3.2 above, self-attribution can be seen as a particular case 
of other-attribution, when the speaker construes him/herself as ‘split’ into two parts 
(Lakoff 1986, Talmy 2000a) and refers to one part as if it was someone else. Latin 
secundum NP expresses both other-attribution and self-attribution. Additionally, 
secundum NP displays a multi-functionality pattern encompassing reportative 
evidentiality and attribution. Whether it is possible to establish a crosslinguistically valid 
unidirectional diachronic evolution path is an issue for future investigation.  
In languages like contemporary Italian, the ‘according to’ construction (e.g. secondo NP) 
expresses other-attribution (53), self-attribution (54), reportative evidentiality (55), and 
(56) inferential evidentiality.  
(53) Secondo          Marco, Roma è  bella. 
 According.to     Mark      Rome is beautiful 
 ‘According to Mark, Rome is beautiful.’ 
(54)  Secondo          me, Roma è  bella.  
 According.to    me   Rome  is  beautiful 
 ‘For me, Rome is beautiful.’ 
(55)  Secondo          la   stampa, il     presidente è  arrivato alle     3.  
 According.to     the press        the   president   is  arrived    at.the   3 
 ‘According to the press, the president arrived at 3.’ 
(56) [La luce è accesa]. Secondo          me, Marco è  in casa.  
 The light is lit.up     According.to      me   Mark   is  in  house 
 ‘The light is on. For me/In my opinion, Mark is in. 
As shown in this study, Latin secundum NP codifies only the first three functions. 
Variation is expected regarding the multi-functionality pattern of ‘according to’ 
constructions, both intra-linguistically and cross-linguistically.   
This paper is based on the direct contrast of attribution and reportative evidentiality. As 
stated in section 1.2, the relationship between self-attribution and inferential 
evidentiality is not pursued further here due to the lack of Latin data. The preliminary 
data from Italian in (53)-(56) above suggests that a deictic model can be proposed both 
Figure 3. Interpersonal 
evidentiality, attribution and 
extended intersubjectivity 
(from Tantucci 2013: 218).
  
Figure 4. Attribution and 
extended intersubjectivity. 
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for evidentiality and attribution. According to Frawley’s (1992) deictic model, reportative 
evidentiality gives the other as the source of information, whereas inferential 
evidentiality is centred on the speaker’s self (i.e. the speaker is seen as the locus of 
reasoning). A similar model is suggested here for attribution (table 4, below): self-
attribution assigns a proposition to the speaker’s self, whereas other-attribution assigns 
a proposition to the mental content of someone other than the speaker. Despite both 
being deictic categories, attribution and reportative evidentiality are distinct in their 
functions, as shown in this paper. 
 Self Other 
Evidentiality Inferential Reportative 
Attribution Self-attribution Other-attribution 
Table 4. Deictic dimensions of evidentiality and attribution. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has presented an overview of secundum NP constructions with reportative 
evidentiality and attribution meanings, thus filling a gap in the literature on Latin 
prepositions. Abstracting away from the specific facts of Latin analysed here, my research 
provided evidence for identifying two separate categories, evidentiality and attribution. 
I argued that attribution and evidentiality express different pragmatic intentions on the 
part of the speaker. Furthermore, the two categories show different development paths, 
reportative evidentiality being tightly connected to conformity, and attribution to 
limitation (arising as an extension of conformity). In addition, the evidential and 
attribution meanings differ in the arguments they take: products of speech and writing 
for the reportative meaning, versus mental content (opinion, thought and belief) for the 
attribution sense. In the case of arguments indicating human participants, the attribution 
and reportative constructions rely on different metonymies: person in lieu of speech or 
writing product for reportative evidentiality, versus person in lieu of mental content for 
attribution. Differences in arguments mirror a major conceptual difference between 
reportative evidentiality and attribution: whereas the former presupposes an act of 
communication, the latter does not. Despite their different functions, I argued that they 
both presuppose extended intersubjectivity and are deictic categories.  
This analysis of the rise of secundum NP’s reportative evidentiality meaning shows the 
importance of socio-cultural phenomena (in this case the spread of Christianity) in 
language change. This was shown in relation to the role of prophecy contexts in the 
development of the reportative sense, and the theological relevance of the evangelium 
secundum (‘the Gospel according to’) NPevangelist construction. In emphasising the 
importance of socio-historical factors in language change, my study takes a similar 
approach to Hartmann (2014) and echoes Hollmann & Siewierska (2011). 
Finally, my results concerning the reportative use of secundum NP suggest that extended 
intersubjectivity may be the source of evidentiality, which is a subjective category, via the 
intermediate stage of interpersonal evidentiality. This suggests a development path of 
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extended intersubjectivity > subjectivity, whose generalisability needs further 
investigation.   
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